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The purpose of this paper is to present how to study tactical phenomena from 
battle space situation pictures to ﬁ  nd  out  if  real  initiative  leads  to  success  in  
the  battle.  In  this  paper,  numerical  values  are  calculated  to determine  whether  
there  is  also  a  correlation  between  situational  awareness  and  initiative.  The  
results  are veriﬁ  ed  based  on  battle  space  situation  pictures.  In  addition,  the  
analyses  of  distributions  describing  the variation in the soldiers’ feelings of 
their own forces and the adversary having the initiative are used to support 
the results showing which ﬁ  ghting side has the initiative.
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1. BACKGROUND
The tactical basic research, 
“Success Factors  of Company 
Attack” (SCA research), which was
carried out in the Finnish Defence 
Forces (FDF) during the years 2004-
2007 forms the empirical background 
of this paper. The SCA research was 
focused on analyzing different individual 
effects of the measured variables, which  
were selected from the areas of tactics, 
situational awareness, battle task load, 
human factors, background factors and 
battle outcome. During this research, 59 
attacks conducted during battle exercises 
by infantry companies were analyzed. 
The research material   used   for   this     
paper   consists   of 590 schematic and 
illustrated tactical maps to describe the 
situation and 118 event catalogues to 
describe the actions taken in the battle 
space. Also, 103 written reports and 
numerical values of 118  measured  
tactical  variables  and  perceptions  of
130  observed  factors  were  utilized  to   
compose this paper. [1] 
2.  THE TACTICAL  
VIEWPOINT &  THE APPLIED
RESEARCH METHODS
In the literature dealing with 
tactics [2]  in the FDF regulations 
and ﬁ  eld manuals, e.g. Komppanian 
taisteluohje [3], KOTO,     2008,         
and     Prikaatin taisteluohje, PRTO, 
1984 [4], and in recent tactical 
research, Huttunen,  2010 [5],   
initiative  is regarded to have an 
essential impact on the success of a 
battle. In the literature dealing with 
tactics, e.g. Kuusisto, 2004 [6], in the 
FDF regulations and ﬁ  eld manuals, 
e.g. KOTO, 2008 and PRTO, 1984, 
and in tactical research, e.g.  Lind, 
1985 [7], Huttunen, 2010, situational 
awareness is also regarded   to have an essential   impact on the success of a 
battle. The SCA research showed that 
the largest differences between the 
values of measured variables were 
found in the mean values of initiative 
in successful and unsuccessful attacks
To be able to establish the size 
of the critical time windows for 
the analyzed tactical actions and to
recognize initiative, observation 
points and veriﬁ  able time delays are 
needed  for  the battle space model. 
The ﬁ  rst observation point is set at
the  battle engagement  moment  of  the 
company.  The second observation 
point is set at the start ofthe weapon 
effect. Two time intervals are
determined, from background  data,   
between these   two   observation     
points.   The   ﬁ  rst   time interval
covers the time used by the leader 
to decide and order the actions. The 
second time interval covers the time 
used  to  perform  the actions to 
start the weapon effect.  The tactical
analysis   of initiative   produces     
three types of information about the 
differences recognized between  the   
initiatives  of  the  infantry  company 
and its adversary:
-   Separated   or   individual   actions   
indicating Initiative;
- Continuous ﬂ  ow of action indicating 
initiative;
- The feeling of having initiative.
The dependency of initiative 
on the fulﬁ  llment of the battle task 
and the suffered casualties is deﬁ  ned 
by establishing probability values 
of initiative and the corresponding 
casualty ratio at each measurement 
level. The next step is to calculate if 
the advantageous initiative indicates 
a positive progress of the casualty 
ratio with a high correlation.
The phenomenon of changes in 
initiative is studied  based on  the   
Battlespace   Situation  picture
series   (BSP)   of   successful     
and   unsuccessful  attacks. The 
investigation concerns 
whether the observations from the 
BSP together with the quantiﬁ  ed 
results  from the written reports 
support each other. The ﬁ  nal step is 
to compare whether the real initiative
led to success in the battle.
3. ANALYZED WRITTEN 
OBSERVATIONS
By quantifying the observations 
collected during the SCA research, 
three main results were  achieved.  
Approximately   39%  of  observations
dealt with such aspects as “initiative 
was taken”,  “was kept”,    “was   
developed”  or  any  other “positive” 
phenomenon connected with 
initiative. A typical observation is 
“The attacker    aimed to take and 
keep the initiative and succeeded 
well in this”.  Roughly  41%  of   
observations  dealt  withsuch aspects 
as “initiative was lost”, “was not
utilized”, “was wasted” or any other 
“negative” phenomenon connected 
with initiative. A typical observation
was “Now the initiative was given 
to the defender and the defender was 
able to stop the adversary’s attack 
with a  small amount of soldiers”. In 
approximately 20% of observations, 
it could not be established which 
ﬁ  ghting  side  had  the   initiative.     
A   typical   observation   is   “The
initiative  alternates signiﬁ  cantly 
between the yellow and blue side”.The evaluation criteria are 
constructed from the previous 
twelve items for analyzing aspects 
which deal with time, timing, the 
speed of actions and initiative.
The literature dealing with 
tactics  contains qualitative results 
that support these observations. 
For example, Rekkedal (2006) [8] 
proposes a connection between the 
leader’s initiative-taking and its effects 
on the timing aspects of a battle.
SOLDIERS’ FEELING  5.
OF HAVING INITIATIVE
In the SCA  research,  soldiers’   
feelings of having initiative were 
measured through questionnaires
and interviews. The results showed 
that the distributions of the results, 
which showed the soldiers on both 
ﬁ  ghting  sides  having  feelings 
about initiative, partly overlapped, 
AF15339, Jakaumatarkastelut, 
2009 [9]. It is therefore interesting
to research if the quantified 
results from the qualitative 
analysis of the written reports from
the SCA research support this ﬁ  nding 
of overlapping distributions.
In  the  background  research,   
the  soldiers  of both fighting  sides 
were asked  to evaluate  their own 
feelings about having initiative 
at each measurement level of an 
attack by making a mark at that 
point on a line, 100 millimetres 
long, indicating the strength of 
their feeling (see Figure  1). As 
a result of this measurement 
arrangement, quantified data was 
collected continuously. This way to 
produce   quantified   and   scaled     
data   made it possible to carry out 
the mathematical analysis dealing 
4. ASPECTS DEALING 
WITH TIME AND TIMING
From the research material, 
seven types of timing dealing with 
battle situations of analyzed attacks 
can be found. In addition to this, 
the classiﬁ  cation  of  the  qualitative 
analysis produced ﬁ  ve   types   of 
speeds   which   are   relevant     
for analyzing different tactical 
phenomena connected with the time 
window.
Based on the results, the 
different types of timing are as 
follows:
Type 1: Well-timed actions
Type 2: Timing of situational 
evaluation (Well- timed evaluation)
Type 3: Knowledge-based timing 
of actions
(Acting in real-time)
Type 4: Ineffectiveness in timing 
(Time is wasted on secondary 
actions)
Type 5: Timing or time ratio 
dealing with trained and unexpected 
situations
Type 6: Timing (time delays) of 
command and control chains
Type 7: Timing of action of one’s 
own force which is forced due to the 
adversary’s actions.
The ﬁ  ve types of speeds which 
are relevant for analyzing different 
tactical phenomena are as follows:
Type 1: Absolute (max./min.) 
value of the action Type 2: Speed 
of the action combined with the 
surprise effect
Type 3: Adjustable speed or 
ﬂ  exible speed adjustment based on 
the battle situation 
Type 4: Tactical motion speed
Type 5: Estimated speed for a 
maneuver or an action.with the soldiers’ feelings about 
having initiative.
The NASA Task Load Index 
(NASA-TLX), presented originally 
by Hart and  Staveland (1988) [10],   
is  a  subjective,  multidimensional
assessment tool that rates perceived 
workload on six different subscales: 
Mental Demand, Physical Demand,
Temporal Demand, Performance, 
Effort, and Frustration. Based on the 
observations of one of the developers 
of NASA-TLX [11], the use of 
NASA-TLX has spread far beyond 
its original application area and focus 
for the past 20 years.  In this paper, 
the measurement and analysis setup 
is applied to evaluate the level of “the 
feelings about having initiative”.
Different types of instruments could 
be utilized for analyzing subjective 
human factors, e.g. vigilance under 
different workloads. For example 
Finomore et al. (2009) [12] have 
compared the output of the Multiple 
Resources Questionnaire (MRQ) 
and NASA-TLX in different task-
types and operating environments. In 
this comparison, the MRQ  indicated   
that  the  workload  was  greater when
observers operated in a multi-task
environment as compared to a single-
task environment,  a dimension  to 
which  the  NASA- TLX was not 
sensitive. In this paper, the NASA-
TLX  principles  for  measuring   
subjective workload  has been 
applied  in the ﬁ  eld  of estimating
“the feelings about having initiative”, 
and therefore,  all  of  the  evaluation   
criteria  of  the original   NASA-TLX     
method   must   be   tuned.These types 
of  restrictions  must  be  understood
when evaluating the observations 
presented in this paper.
For tactical analysis purposes, 
it is necessary to establish which
ﬁ  ghting  side  has  the  initiative  at 
each moment of the attack and 
how strong the initiative is. This is 
carried out by calculating the size 
of the overlapping area of  the two   
distributionsdescribing  the variation 
in the soldiers’ feelings about 
own forces’ and adversary’s taking 
the initiative. (see Figure 2). The 
probability that both sides feel they 
have the initiative is calculated.
Fig. 1. Measuring and quantifying the data 
dealing with the soldiers’ feelings about 
having initiative.
The probability of the two ﬁ  ghting 
sides to have different opinions about 
having the initiative  is  calculated  by  
applying  the  simple Equation 1.
Fig. 2. The overlapping area of the two
distributions describing the variation in the
feeling of having the initiative.
where
zp = Normal distribution coefﬁ  cient
b = Mean value (own side)
r = Mean value (adversary)
ıb = Standard deviation (own side)
ır = Standard deviation (adversary).According  to  the  calculated   
results,  on average, the calculated 
risk of a contradiction between who
has the initiative is 2.1 to 2.7 times 
higher in unsuccessful attacks. In 
successful attacks, the correlation 
between the feeling of having the
initiative and the casualty ratio is 
remarkable  ŇrŇ=0.694.  However, 
the coefﬁ  cient    of determination 
as a percentage is only 48%.
Although  the  analyzed  results  of   
initiative indicate  a  remarkable   
difference  between successful and 
unsuccessful attacks, these results
only  deal  with  the  “feelings  about 
having the initiative”. Therefore, 
more weight is given to the results 
gained from the BSP to ﬁ  nd  out 
how initiative   affects   the   result     
of   an   attack.   A practical case 
example is presented on a tactical
map in Figure 4. Equation 1 is 
valid only  when  both  distributions   
describing  the feeling of the ﬁ  ghting 
sides’ initiative follows a normal  
distribution  curve.  In this  case,  the
normality   of   the   analyzed   curves   
has   been  checked both near the 
mean value (Kolmogorov- Smirnov) 
and at the ends of distribution curves
(Anderson-Darling). If  needed,  the
combination of normal distribution 
andWeibull distribution  is  available  
to  calculate  the probability of the 
overlapping area [13].
6. OBSERVATIONS  FROM  
TACTICAL MAPS AND EVENT 
CATALOGUES
When recognizing and analyzing 
initiative, tactical maps  and  event 
catalogues  play a key role. Items 
to be recognized and their possible
indicators are presented in Table 1. 
The principal ﬂ  owchart (see Figure 
3), which includes feedback loops
to  also  check  the  right  timing   
of  each tactical action together 
with situation evaluation,  success  
evaluations  are  therefore  often  used  
to illustrate tactical phenomena.
Relevance,   importance,   the 
right  sequential order and timing of 
the followed items changeconstantly 
with the situation. The evaluation 
of these features is possible either 
relatively or qualitatively in a 
speciﬁ  ed  situation.  This  enables
the expression   of the differences   
between one’s own forces and the 
adversary using the terms  “more” 
or “less” and “faster” or “slower” 
corresponding to simpliﬁ  ed  values 
of “yes” and “no”.
Fig. 3. Flowchart for analyzing attacks 
(notice also right timing of actions and 
situation evaluation).Tactical 
phenomena
Tactical maps Event catalogues
Item
Probable
indicator Item Probable
indicator
Changes in
initiative
Readiness to
manoeuvre
Positioning
related to
terrain and
adversary
Readiness to
manoeuvre High/low
Readiness
to use ﬁ  re
Positions of
mortars,  
antitank
and light
weapons
Readiness
to use ﬁ  re
Sign/order
Preparation
Signal links
Decision
making
Action/no
action
Action
according to
decision
Decision
making
Decision/no
decision
Content and
pursuit
Deception
Patrol/subunit
manoeuvre
Use of ﬁ  re Deception
Sign/order
and timing
Content and
pursuit
Manoeuvre Battle pull Manoeuvre Sign/order
Use of ﬁ  re Casualties Use of ﬁ  re Timing
Reserve Subunit
position
Reserve Order/
sign
Subunit
readiness
Table no. 1.  T h e  list of items (i.e. dealing with initiative) to be recognized 
and their possible indicators.
The case study exempliﬁ  ed on the 
map (see Figure 4) shows that initiative 
is recognized in the case of this battle 
based on the following criteria:
- The dotted lines show the trained, 
planned and prepared maneuvers 
of platoons or other reasonable 
elements, which are planned for 
use in fulﬁ  lling  the  battle  task 
(“BEAT”).
- The tactical symbols show how the 
leader has planned to utilize trained, 
planned and prepared reconnaissance 
to support situation evaluation and 
decision making.  It  is  essential  to   
notice  that unlike  in  unsuccessful   
attacks,  in  this  case  the leader 
has used his initiative to carry out
reconnaissance  processes  actively   
and early enough.
- The tactical symbol shows that 
the leader has shown his initiative 
in combining the plans of trained
maneuvers with the timely and 
justiﬁ  ed use of indirect ﬁ  re.
By applying the previous 
ﬂ  owchart model, it is possible even 
to calculate the number of observed main aspect which unfavorably 
affected  the result of the attacks 
was that the leaders had lost   their     
freedom   of   action   by   giving     
the initiative  to  the  adversary,   
which  made  it impossible   to   
affect  the  adversary   in  creative
ways.  In the literature dealing  
with tactics, these kinds   of     
aspect   have   been   emphasized 
(e.g. Liddell   Hart,   1954) [14].   In 
addition   t o  this,    the leader’s 
personal character has not been 
open to looking for new possibilities 
to take initiative.  These types of 
aspects have also been noticed by
Tynkkynen (1996) [15]. Hannah et 
al. (2010) [16] have identiﬁ  ed  the 
importance of the leader’s character, 
but they integrate also the leader’s 
skills, knowledge and competences 
with different types of roles which the 
leader might have in the battleﬁ  eld.
The quantitative analysis 
conducted in this research has shown 
that there is a positive correlation 
between one’s own strengthened
initiative and an advantageous 
casualty ratio together with the 
fulﬁ  lled  battle task.  Based on
the analyzed situational maps of 
different attacks, it has been shown 
in this paper how strongly the
initiative of one’s own force affects 
the success of an attack and how 
initiative or actions of initiative can
be observed in the situational maps.
According to the results, a larger 
number of observations   of one’s 
own initiative indicated
better success in battle. In addition to 
these, the analyzed numerical values 
have indicated that leaders   seem     
to   have   a   strong   “feeling   of
initiative” in successful attacks.
characteristics. The results show that 
the number of   positive   replies   to     
the   questions   in   the ﬂ  owchart 
is on average 2.3 times higher in
successful attacks.
Fig. 4. An analyzed example of how 
initiative had an effect on the leader’s 
decision-making in the deployment area in 
one of the successful attacks.
7. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has shown that 
initiative is in a key role when 
analyzing the aspects affecting the 
success of an attack.
When discussing initiative, it was 
shown that an almost equal amount 
of positive and negative observations 
about having initiative were recorded. 
Approximately 39% of positive 
observations and approximately 41% 
of negative observations of initiative 
were directly connected with timing 
or a time window.  This means that 
the reasons for either the failure or 
success of an attack are connected 
with initiative, and furthermore, with 
time and timing.
When comparing successful and 
unsuccessful  attacks, the following 
main result was gained: Thedominant 
phenomena causing failure are 
found from aspects dealing with 
initiative. On the other hand, the REFERENCES
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